Patriotism is not a viable option for the traditional universalistic moral systems, including Kantian rationalism and especially for consequentialism. I follow Sosa in claiming that not all forms of consequentialism have to lack ‘deontic components’. I follow up with a stronger claim, that not all systems, deontic or consequentialist, have to accept strong universalism that precludes non-instrumental special moral concerns. I present the main alternatives: a. Dancy’s moral particularism; b. Nagel’s idea of partiality based on the non-reducible difference between personal and impersonal view points; c. Scheffler’s concern with non-voluntary special duties; d. A broad range of philosophies, from Aristotle’s to the ethics of care that use non-homogenous models.
 I close by claiming that the non-homogenous models result in viable moral theories. Such theories treat ethics not as a source of moral recommendations to the effect of what should happen in a given situation, but rather as rules of a largely competitive game that adjudicate two things: 1. what each agent should do in a given situation; 2. what constraints should be imposed on the manner in which that moral competition is taking place.